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CURRENT LEGISLATION
cause an ingenious litigant had found a new argument by reading
into an already ambiguous claim or defense what was never intended
to exist, will never reach the court. It is hoped that in the face of
such clear language parties will inspect their case to see if it fits the
statute and fail in all attempts to distort the statute to fit their case.
A. MATTHEW BROUGHTON, JR.
GENERAL LEGACIES-WHEN CHARGEABLE AGAINST REAL PROP-
ERTY-RECENT STATUTORY AmENDMENT.-Section 47-d of the De-
cedent Estate Law, added to the law of New York State in 1947,
substitutes a statutory intent of a testator to satisfy the general leg-
aies of his will out of real property not specifically devised, where
formerly the courts had the discretion of implying an intent to charge
the realty. The statute provides:
If the personal property of a testator is insufficient for full payment of his
general legacies so much of his real property not specifically devised as shall
be necessary for payment of the balance shall be sold and the proceeds used
for such payment unless the will shall contain an express direction to the
contrary.'
This statutory provision represents a material alteration in the
law of wills. The amendment becomes effective immediately but only
applies to wills executed after August 31, 1947.
A will of a deceased person represents that person's intent. It
is that individual's decision as to the disposition to be made of his
property after his death. When a will is submitted to a court for
interpretation or construction, the intent embodied therein must be
followed by the court unless contrary to public policy or to an estab-
lished rule of law.2 It is the duty of the court to find and enforce
this intent of the testator, whether expressed in the will or implied
from the language used and the surrounding circumstances attending
the execution.
The testamentary intent with which the statute under considera-
tion deals, relates only to the general legacies of a will. A general
legacy has been defined as a gift of personal property by a last will
not amounting to a bequest of a particular thing or money, or of a
particular fund separated from all other funds. 3 Where there is an
express intent to charge a general legacy against the realty there is
no problem. However, where there is no express intent to charge
1 Laws of N. Y. 1947, c. 521.
2 Matter of Buechmer, 226 N. Y. 440, 444, 123 N. E. 741, 742 (1919);
Robinson v. Martin, 200 N. Y. 159, 164, 93 N. E. 488, 489 (1910).
a Matter of Anslinger, 185 Misc. 827, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 466 (Surr. Ct.
1945).
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the realty the difficulties arise. Under the early common law, in
the absence of an expression of intent by the testator to charge the
realty, the personal property alone could be charged, since the will,
representing the directions of the testator, was to be carefully fol-
lowed.4 It had always been a firmly established rule that the personal
property of the testator was the natural and primary fund to be ap-
plied in payment of debts and legacies, and if there was insufficient
personal property, the legacies had to abate.5 Thus, where a tes-
tator provided for a general legacy, but there was not sufficient per-
sonal property to pay it, the legacy abated.6 However, in their early
recognition of the need for equitable justice, the courts held that leg-
acies could be charged upon real estate, without express direction in
the will, if the intention of the testator so to do could be fairly
gathered from all the provisions of the will, and extraneous circum-
stances were considered in aid of the'terms of the will. 7 This left to
the courts the difficult task of determining the implied intent of the
testator. It was this task which created confusion in the decisions
and-resulted in the recommendation that the law be changed by the
legislature.8
Before the present statute the courts, in probing for the implied
intent of the testator, were guided by several well recognized prin-
ciples of law. First, they could refer to the language used in the
will 9 or to the directions of the will and the condition of the estate
at the time of execution.'0 Thus, use of the expression "my estate"
throughout the will would indicate that the testator contemplated no
distinction between real and personal property I" and the real estate
therefore could be charged. Secondly, extrinsic evidence could be
used only for the purpose of interpreting something which was actu-
ally within the will, 12 and there had to be some.provision in the will
which would serve as a subject for interpretation.' 8 This limitation
was added to prevent the introduction of extrinsic evidence, for the
purpose of adding to the will, under the guise of interpretation, pro-
'Hoes v. Van Hosen, 1 N. Y. 120 (1847).
5 Taylor v. Dodd, 58 N. Y. 335 (1874) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds' Executors,
16 N. Y. 257 (1857) ; Matter of Lilienthal, 139 Misc. 225, 246 N. Y. Supp. 459(Surr. Ct. 1930).6 Reynolds v. Reynolds' Executors, 16 N. Y. 257 (1857).
7 Irwin v. Teller, 188 N. Y. 25, 80 N. E. 376 (1907) ; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 85
N. Y. 142 (1881); Taylor v. Dodd, 58 N. Y. 335 (1874).
8 See Draftsmaq's Note to § 47-d, D. E. L.
9 McCorn v. McCorn, 100 N. Y. 511, 3 N. E. 480 (1885) ; ef. Matter of
Kreusser, 108 Misc. 111, 178 N. Y. Supp. 62 (Surr. Ct. 1919) (language used
showed no intent to charge); see Matter of Bohner, 261 App. Div. 1045, 26
N. Y. S. 2d 558, 559 (4th Dep't 1941), aff'd, 287 N. Y. 672, 39 N. E. 2d 290(1941).
10 Matter of Herborn, 187 App. Div. 938, 174 N. Y. Supp. 905 (2d Dep't
1919).
11 Cf. Taylor v. Dodd, 58 N. Y. 335, 345 (1874).




visions which were not otherwise found in the will at all.14 Finally,
the rule was also laid down that the intention of the testator must be
determined from the circumstances existing at the time of execution
of the will; any circumstances occurring thereafter being in-
admissible.15
Limited by these qualifications and encouraged by a desire to
work justice and carry out the intent of the testator, the courts of
this state mainly relied upon six factors in seeking the implied intent
of the testator. These factors were to aid the court in arriving at
a logical and legal conclusion as to the testator's intent. They in-
volve finely drawn elements of law and a court could not arrive at
a proper legal result based on these factors without a very extensive
study of them in relation to the peculiar circumstances of each case.
The resulting decisions represent conclusions reached on the basis
of an incomplete analysis of the particular circumstances of each case,
rather than on the basis of principles and rules of law thoroughly
considered. The legal value of the decisions was lost and the pos-
sibility of violating the actual intent of the testator increased.
First, a reduction in personal property and an increase in real
property after execution of the will, with no change in the will, would
be considered, and could suggest the inference that the testator in-
tended to give the real estate in place of the personalty in the legacy.
Although an apparently strong indication of intent, this was weak-
ened by the rule that circumstances occurring after the execution of
the will could not be considered.' 6 The courts seldom confused this
factor because the rule barring subsequent circumstances was firmly
established,' 7 but it represents the first opportunity for the courts to
act contrary to the testator's actual intent.
Second, the court would consider the significance of a blending
of real and personal property in the residuary clause, it might have
been added as a protective measure,' 8 to catch any property about to
pass as in intestacy, and thereby direct its passage. This situation
would exist, for example, where the will itself indicated the disposi-
tion to be made of most of the property of the testator. In any such
case the residuary clause Would be a supplemental part of the docu-
ment, added to the will without much thought on the testator's part,
and hardly sufficient from which to imply any intent on the part of
the testator. The courts, in such circumstances, properly should have
refused to give any weight to a blending of the real estate and per-
14 Chase Nat. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 164 Misc. 508, 299 N. Y.
Supp. 926 (Sup. Ct 1934).15 Morris v. Sickly-, 133 N. Y. 456, 31 N. E. 332 (1892); In re Crandall's
Will, - Misc. -, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 741 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
16 Cases cited note 15 supra.
17Harvey v. Kennedy 81 App. Div. 261, 80 N. Y. Supp. 878 (3d Dep't
1903), aff'd, 177 N. Y. 553, 69 N. E. 1124 (1904).
L8 Matter of Sargent, 215 App. Div. 639, 214 N. Y. Supp. 479 (3d Dep't
1926).
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sonalty in the residuary clause. 19 In other cases, however, the will
to be construed could have indicated that the testator intended the
residuary clause as the main provision of the will and the previous
declarations as supplemental provisions. 20 In such a case, the residu-
ary clause contained the testator's chief purpose and the blending
factor was completely overshadowed by the implied intent that the
residuary clause was the main provision of the will. In those other
cases, where the court would consider the blending clause as having
some weight, the court could take notice of the amount of undevised
real property belonging to the testator at death, and this should re-
sult in a greater or lesser weight in considering the blending. 2 1 Of
course, where the real and personal property was separated in the
residuary clause, there was no difficulty in finding that the testator
did not intend to charge the legacies against the realty 22 Also in
the absence of a residuary clause, the court could without much con-
sideration charge the realty rather than leave it pass by the rules of
intestacy,23 since courts favor testacy. However, in the normal case,
where there was a blending of real and personal property, it required
that the above distinctions be clearly made. This presented another
"stumbling block"' for the court and unless each particular case was
carefully analyzed the court could be misled and the actual intent
thwarted.
Third, the courts considered the relationship between the tes-
tator and the legatee or devisee and favored the natural object of the
testator's bounty. This was based on the presumed intent of the
testator to benefit those closely related to him. For example, in a
case of doubtful intention, a construction was given in favor of a
widow over a nephew.24  In almost every case, however, where a
relative was favored over a stranger, there were additional factors
present to be considered.25 In one case a residuary devisee, the natu-
ral object of bounty, was favored in spite of power to sell and a
blending of real and personal property in the residuary clause.2 6
19Brill v. Wright, 112 N. Y. 129, 19 N. E. 628 (1889); In re Wood's
Estate, - Misc. -, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 726 (Surr. Ct. 1942); Matter of Crane,
170 Misc. 739, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 805 (Surr. Ct. 1939); Beebe v. Lockwood, 103
Misc. 336, 170 N. Y. 1036 (Sup. Ct. 1918).20 Bevan v. Cooper, 72 N. Y. 317 (1878).
21I I re Warren's Will, - Misc. -, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 887 (Surr. Ct 1945).2 2 Brennan v. Adler, 190 App. Div. 589, 180 IT. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't
1920).
23 Ely v. Megie, 219 N. Y. 112, 113 N. E. 800 (1916).
24 Matter of Bohner, 261 App. Div. 1045, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 558 (4th Dep't
1941), aff'd, 287 N. Y. 672, 39 N. E. 2d 290 (1941).25 Matter of Bohner, 261 App. Div. 1045, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 558 (4th Dep't
1941), aff'd, 287 N. Y. 672, 39 N. E. 2d 290 (1941) ; Scott v. Stebbins, 91 N. Y.
605 (1883); In re Claussen's Will, - Misc. -, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (Surr. Ct.
1941) ; Matter of Charity C. Mould, 117 Misc. 1, 190 N. Y. Supp. 439 (Surr.
Ct. 1921), aff'd, 204 App. Div. 889, 197 N. Y. Supp. 931 (1922), aff'd, 236
N. Y. 582, 142 N. E. 293 (1923).




Where there was a relationship present the court was not faced with
the possibility of defeating the testator's intent so much as with the
problem of weighing this factor as against the other factors in the
particular case suggesting a contrary intent, thus creating the danger
of enlarging or disregarding its value, according to the equitable
views of the court.
Fourth, a power to sell could be present. This calls for care-
ful consideration for as will be seen it could easily confuse the issue.
A power to sell might indicate a power to sell for the benefit of the
interested parties, or for the benefit of the entire estate by effecting
a conversion of all property into personalty. In cases where there
was a power to sell, there existed a related question as to whether
the proceeds should be applied in payment of general legacies.27
Where a naked power was given in a will, it had been interpreted as
a power to convert the property for the benefit of the specific benefi-
ciaries 6r the residuary devisees. 28 It is this naked power of sale
which was given to the executor by Section 13 of the Decedent Es-
tate Law, in the absence of an express denial of such power (where
parties are entitled to real estate, it may be sold for distribution of
the proceeds to them).29 Section 234 of the Surrogate Court Act
also referred to this type of power. This power to sell is not to be
confused with a power of sale in order to convert the realty into
personalty for the benefit of the general legatees. If the power is to
have any weight in implying an intent to charge the realty, for the
benefit of the general legatees it must be more than this naked power
to sel. 30 It must clearly show that it is the power to sell for the
benefit of the general legatees, and not for the benefit of the inter-
ested parties under the will. Such a power would be a power to sell
plus a power over the realty, and works an equitable conversion of
the real property to the extent necessary to satisfy the legacies. 31 No
definite value can be placed on a power to sell unless the power is
first defined as a naked power or a power to convert the property
2 7 Matter of Sargent, 215 App. Div. 639, 214 N. Y. Supp. 479 (3d Dep't
1926).28 Matter of Disbrow, 145 Misc. 584, 261 N. Y. Supp. 635 (Surr. Ct. 1932).29 Matter of Crane, 170 Misc. 739, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 805 (Surr. Ct. 1939)
(D. E. L. § 13 was amended by Laws of 1947, C. 752, in order to give execu-
tors and administrators a more effective power of sale. Prior to this change,
the power of sale given by § 13(1), D. E. L., was restricted by subsection 3
of the same section limiting the exercise of the power to those purposes stated
in Art. 13 of the Surr. Ct Act. As amended, the power of sale is only
limited by § 13(2), D. E. L. Section 13 now gives a power to sell in order
to satisfy general legacies out of real property not devised when there is in-
suficient personal property).0Brennan v. Adler, 190 App. Div. 589, 180 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't
1920) (Sections 2702 and 2703 of the C. C. P. referred to in the case gave a
limited power to sell real property to the executor. This power is substan-
tially retained by §§ 233 and 234 of the Surr. Ct. Act) ; In re Wood's Estate,
- Misc. -, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 726 (Sgrr. Ct. 1942).31 Matter of Soper, 224 App. Div. 431, 231 N. Y. Supp. 333 (4th Dep't
1928).
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for the use of the general legatees. In the former case, the real prop-
erty would not be charged, while in the latter case, it would be
charged. The courts have often failed to distinguish these two pos-
sible explanations. Here then where there was a factor which could
assist a court decisively in finding an intent to charge, the difficulty
lay in the need for careful analysis, and, in its absence, the weight
to be given to this factor remained indefinite.3 2 The court might
easily be misled again to rule contrary to the actual intent of the
testator.
Fifth, a known deficiency of personal property at the time of
the execution of the will as compared with the sum of the legacies
was considered. This factor had been given conclusive weight in
finding an intent to charge the real property.83 The basis of this con-
clusion was the belief that no man, in making a final disposition of
his estate, would make a legacy, save with the honest, sober-minded
intention that it would be paid. 4 At the outset the application of
the rule was qualified. The deficiency had to be clear and more than
a slight deficiency, and the testator must have known that the per-
sonal property was less than the legacies. A deficiency at the time
of republication of the will satisfied the requirement of a deficiency
at the time of execution, under this rule. 5 In a further qualification
it had been held that an intention to charge would not be inferred
from the disparity between personal property, and legacies if the tes-
tator could have been mistaken as to the value of the personal prop-
erty at the time of execution or was in reasonable expectancy of in-
creasing her personal property before her death.3 6 Under this rule,
the use of the words "personal and r6al property" in the residuary
clause had been taken as an indication of the belief that there would
be personal property remaining, and that, therefore, the testator was
mistaken 7 Where a deficiency existed, it was considered with evi-
dence of a charitable intent; and an intent to charge was implied.38
A deficiency had been taken with other factors to charge real prop-
erty, 9 and where there was no deficiency, the court had failed to
32 Matter of Tatum, 169 N. Y. 514, 62 N. E. 580 (1902); Kalbfleisch v.
Kalbfleisch, 67 N. Y. 354 (1876); Taylor v. Dodd, 58 N. Y. 335 (1874);
Carberry v. Ennis, 72 App. Div. 489, 76 N. Y. Supp. 537 (2d Dep't 1902).
a3 Briggs v. Carroll, 117 N. Y. 288, 22 N. E. 1054 (1889); Stewart v.
Crysler, 52 App. Div. 597, 65 N. Y. Supp. 483 M&I Dep't 1900); Matter of
Liienthal, 139 Misc. 225, 246 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Surr. Ct. 1930). Contra:
Brennan v. Adler, 190 App. Div. 589, 180 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't 1920).
84Goddard v. Pomeroy, 36 Barb. 546 (N. Y. 1862).-
35 McManus v. McManus, 179 N. Y. 338, 72 N. E. 235 (1904) ; McCorn v.
McCorn, 100 N. Y. 511, 3 N. E. 480 (1885); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 85 N. Y. 142
(1881) ; In re Shultis' Estate, - Misc. , 52 N. Y. S. 2d 474 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
so Matter of Charity C. Mould, 117 Misc. 1, 190 N. Y. Supp. 439 (Surr.
Ct. 1921) ; Matter of Dooley, 153 Misc. 533, 275 N. Y. Supp. 463 (Surr. Ct.
1934).
a';Matter of Charity C. Mould, 117 Misc. 1, 190 N. Y. Supp. 439 (Surr. Ct
1921).
as Ely v. Megie, 219 N. Y. 112, 113 N. E. 800 (1916).
39 Carley v. Harper, 219 N. Y. 295, 114 N. E. 351 (1916).
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charge the property although a power to sell and a blending in the
residuary clause was present.40 The decisions, reflecting the uncer-
tainty of this factor, vary from a holding that the deficiency factor
was the dominating feature 4' to a holding that the property was
charged, although there was no deficiency, on the basis of a power
to sell and a blending in the residuary clause.42 The task existed to
weigh this factor against other factors suggesting a contrary intent
and a slight variation in interpretation of the above rules would re-
sult in a different decision, and possible defeat of the testator's intent.
Finally, a direction by the testator to charge the inheritance and
transfer taxes to the residuary estate had been taken as conclusive
evidence of an intent to charge the real estate, where the personal
property was insufficient to pay the taxes. 43 From this direction, the
court implied an intent to pay the legacies at all events, from any
source, and they were given a prior claim to any property not specifi-
cally devised or bequeathed. Where the personal property was suf-
ficient to pay the taxes, such direction had been held to be not con-
clusive of an intent to charge the real property.44 This factor would
seem to be the easiest factor to correctly weigh by itself but it is
doubtful how it would be evaluated when contradicted by other
factors.
The determination of the implied intent of the testator, from the
language used and from the surrounding circumstances, rested in the
analysis of the court and the manner in which it interpreted these
factors. Manifestly, this was an undesirable situation and a mere
cursory examination of the amendment under consideration will re-
veal that it is designed to abrogate entirely these unwieldy and un-
workable rules so as to remove the matter of intent from judicial
consideration. Since the six factors heretofore discussed are not all
inclusive a court might weigh other factors peculiar to a case in
question. As a result, no crystallization of the decisional law was
possible or workable. In addition, courts have been inclined to take
notice of the failure of the average testator to appreciate the differ-
ence existing between real and personal property. In recent years,
there has developed a presumption that the testator intended legacies
to be paid in full and there also has been an inclination by the courts
40 Matter of Bohner, 261 App. Div. 1045, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 558 (4th Dep't
1941), aff'd, 287 N. Y. 672, 39 N. E. 2d 290 (1941) ; McGoldrick v. Bodkin, 140
App. Div. 196, 125 N. Y. Supp. 101 (2d Dep't 1910); Harvey v. Kennedy,
81 App. Div. 261, 80 N. Y. Supp. 878 (3d Dep't 1903) ; Van Gillurve v. Becker,
56 Misc. 157, 106 N. Y. Supp. 1080 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
41 Matter of Muller, 183 Misc. 957, 960, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 767, 771 (Surr. Ct.
1944) ; Matter of Lumnis, 101 Misc. 258, 270, 166 N. Y. Supp. 936, 944 (Surr.
Ct. 1917).
42 Matter of Tiffany, 157 Misc. 873, 285 N. Y. Supp. 971 (Surr. Ct. 1935).4 3 Matter of Sargent, 215 App. Div. 639, 214 N. Y. Supp. 479 (3d Dep't
1926); Matter of McEvoy, 139 Misc. 349, 248 N. Y. Supp. 348 (Surr. Ct.
1931); Matter of Lilienthal, 139 Misc. 225, 246 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Surr. Ct.
1930).
44 In re Warren's Will, - Misc. -, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 887 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
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to lighten the presumption against real property, in favor of the
legatees. 45
The amendment was enacted in order to replace the intricate
intent-finding process of the courts with a simple and exact statutory
standard. By abrogating the long-standing rule, that general leg-
acies were chargeable only against personal property and never
,gainst realty unless the will implied such a charge,46 Section 47-d
of the Decedent Estate Law lifted the burden on the courts of probing
for an implied intent to charge the realty. Now, unless there is an
express direction not to charge the realty, it will be charged. How-
ever, the statute does not change the rule that the personal property
is the primary fund for the payment of general legacies.47 This
amendment is a clear break with the long recognized principle that
the intent of the testator, express or implied, is to be the uppermost
consideration, Under the amendment, the court cannot find an im-
plied intent not to charge the real property, however clear the cir-
cumstantial evidence may be. The burden placed on the legatee of
producing evidence of the intent of the testator to charge the realty 48
has been removed. The burden now rests on the testator to expressly
exonerate the realty if such is his desire. The rule of determining
implied intent has given way before an established rule of law. The
change authorizes a sale of the residuary real property, after the per-
sonal property has been exhausted, for the satisfaction of the general
legatees to the extent of their legacies. Specific devises of real prop-
erty are not affected since the amendment applies only to real prop-
erty in the residuary estate, or, if there is no residuary clause, to real
property as to which the testator died intestate. The incidental re-
sult of the change is to warn those preparing and executing wills to
be very specific as to the manner in which it is desired to satisfy the
general legacies in the will. The statutory change should also dis-
courage the practice of using the residuary clause as the main pro-
d5 Matter of Lummis, 101 Misc. 258, 166 N. Y. Supp. 936 (Surr. Ct. 1917).
46 See Draftsman's Note to § 47-d, D. E. L.
d7 This rule was first adopted in this country at the time of the Revolution
and was based on the law of England at that time. Such a rule was particu-
larly desirable in England where real property was a prized possession, limited
in extent and of great value. It was more logical to conclude a mistake by the
testator, in the absence of a provision for the disposition of the real property,
than to conclude that the testator wished to dispose of his realty in satisfaction
of the legacies in the will. In this country, where land is so abundant and so
frequently transferred, there was, and is today, no reasqn for continuing this
protection, given to real property, in the interpretation of a will. American
courts and legislatures have arrived at this conclusion and are slowly pro-
ceeding to eliminate the distinctions between real and personal property in the
interpretation and preparation of wills. This statutory enactment at most may
be a link in this chain of legal development.
s Briggs v. Carroll, 117 N. Y. 288, 22 N. E. 1054 (1889) ; Brill v. Wright,
112 N. Y. 129, 19 N. E. 628 (1889) ; Matter of Bohner, 261 App. Div. 1045,
26 N. Y. S. 2d 558 (4th Dep't 1941), aff'd, 287 N. Y. 672, 39 N. E. 2d 290
(1941) ; In re Warren's Will, - Misc. -, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 887 (Surr. Ct. 1945);
Matter of Dooley, 153 Misc. 533, 275 N. Y. Supp. 463 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
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vision of the will, for under the revised statute all residuary property
will be subject to all general legacies in the will, unless it is otherwise
expressly provided.
In its final result, the statutory change has substituted a rule of
law for an unwieldy group of decisions attempting to gve equitable
justice in the interpretation of wills as to the testator's intent in the
payment of general legacies and distribution of real property not
specifically devised.
JoHN P. MAHON.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIM AcT-A FURTHER WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY.-Congress recognizing the need for a more efficient and
just method of settling private tort claims brought by any citizen
against the United States arising out of the negligence or wrongful
acts of any employee, while carrying out his duties of employment or
office, passed Public Law No. 601 of the 79th Congress known as
the "Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946" of which Title IV is
known as the "Federal Tort Claim Act." I Now, the United States
Government can be sued without the claimant first obtaining consent;
in effect the Federal Government has waived its sovereign immunity
in regard to claims arising out of causes as outlined in the Act.
Formerly, since the Government very rarely consented to be
sued,2 the only method of redress for negligent injury in a case, for
example, of negligent operation of a motor vehicle was for the claim-
ant to get a judgment against the driver of the Government vehicle,
which was usually uncollectible due to the financial status of the em-
ployee. The judgment was then presented to the Congressional
Claims Committee in order to have a private claims bill passed. Such
a bill had to be introduced in Congress by a member, asking for an
appropriation of a sum of money to be paid to the beneficiary of this
private bill as compensation for the loss he had suffered. However,
the percentage of these private bills that were passed in comparison to
the number introduced was small. These bills in addition to being
a very costly proposition even as far as printing costs alone were
concerned, took up much of the valuable time of Congress.3
The Act as passed concerns itself with common law torts.
Under the terms of the Act the principal tort for which the Gov-
ernment waives its sovereign immunity and allows itself to be sued
now as a matter of right is that of negligence. There are express
160 STAT. 843 (1946), 28 U. S. C. § 921 (Supp. 1946).
2 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586, 85 L. ed. 1058, 1061
(1941) ("The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it
consents to be sued.").
3 H. R. Doc. No. 562, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1942) ; H. R. Rep. No. 667,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926).
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